

[159 cont.]

x 648
721 We are obliged to note with surprise, however, that in spite of these conquests and hostilities of a people subject to Galdan Tsyren, the Great Horde never dared to go and attack the Dzungars, nor even to call themselves independent of them.

x 648
662 Some years later, in 1749, Tiul Biu, who had been driven out of Tashkent by Kusiak [sic] Bek and was dissatisfied by his insignificance, wished to elevate himself through the protection of Russia, and he sent deputies to Orenburg to propose that he become a Russian subject (1). His weakness was no doubt known

1. Tevkelev mentions this in one of his journals.

to the Russian government, and his proposal also had no effect.

• [152] The terror with which the Dzungars filled the Kazaks and the apparent submission of the latter lasted until internal dissensions began to weaken the Dzungars and until these dissensions finally led to the complete dispersal of this people, as is known. The disagreement had scarcely begun to be noticeable when the Kazaks took the most active part in it. They offered asylum to all the exiled Dzungarian princes and zaisangs, and joined with [726] them to avenge their wrongs. They attacked their enemies, and on the pretext of helping the unfortunate, they never let the opportunity pass of weakening their old enemies by raids. Finally, when the Chinese wished to interfere in the dissensions of the Dzungars, and the success of their arms had reduced Galdan Tsyren's successors to a state of utter weakness, then the Kazaks of the Great Horde took Amursan's (2) side and formed a part of

2. This prince was the last Dzungarian sovereign. At first he was a subject of China, then her enemy, and he died in Russia.

the army which opposed the invaders [160] until 1756, the time when the Dzungarian empire, which had been so powerful ten years earlier, fell under the blows of the Chinese. The people who had

x [192 cont.]

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64) their seal on the leaves on which the oath was written in lieu of signature. In imitation of them, 128 Kazak elders of the Middle Horde swore the oath in a neighboring tent, and the people took the oath outdoors. This ceremony was followed by a feast, the firing of artillery, etc.

x 648 On the following day the Khan, accompanied by Ablai, returned to Orenburg to discuss Kazak matters. During this meeting Prince Urusov particularly insisted that they should
[439] escort the caravans coming from Russia or returning there, that
728] they should surrender the goods seized by the Great Horde from Muller's caravan, and that they should put an end to the disagreements existing between the Kazaks and the Volga Kalmuks. They were unable to satisfy this last request because they belonged to
[72] a people which was more accustomed to pillage than to obeying its chiefs. Furthermore, the Kalmuks had suffered more from the Little Horde, which was their closest neighbor. We will add, by way of proof, that in this same year, 1740, Abulkhair himself sent nearly 3,000 Kazaks to ravage the Kalmuk uluses.

[579] It was impossible to satisfy the demand for escorts for the caravans. Ablai, who was more powerful than Abul Mahmet, could have assumed this obligation, but it was not to the advantage of the people or the chiefs, since no matter how high a price the escort received, it could not counterbalance the benefits accruing to the Kazaks from seizing the goods.

Two days after the first meeting with the chiefs of the Middle Horde, Prince Urusov invited them, together with the sons of Abulkhair, to come to see the maneuvers of the infantry and artillery. Abul Mahmet and Ablai admired the exercises [193] and especially the fireworks which were displayed in their honor.
[62] But in order to avoid meeting Abul Mahmet, Nurali and Erali
152] not only failed to appear in response to the invitation which they had received, but left Orenburg the same day without taking leave of Prince Urusov. It was later learned that the real reason for this hasty departure was the fear of being kept as hostages in Russia at the instigation of Abul Mahmet.

The Khan and the sultans left Orenburg giving every sign of submission and devotion to the Russian government. But the events

[200 cont.]

x 648
662 No matter how insincere the Kazaks' protestations of obedience were and how vain their promises to return the prisoners, protect the caravans, etc., at least from the moment they had declared themselves vassals until the year 1743, neither they nor their subjects had dared to make raids openly on the Russian borders or against their fortresses. But in the course of this year, they gave evidence of extraordinary daring, secretly incited by the same Abulkhair, who never ceased to assure the Russian government of his good faith and of his carrying out of all the duties of a faithful subject. Having been met with a formal refusal to accept his illegitimate son Chingis in place of his son Khodja Akhmet, he was
● [572] so angry that he began to incite the Kazaks to attack the border villages. One can imagine that his subjects were not slow to profit by counsel which was both advantageous to them and in accord with their customs. At once pillaging, murder, and the carrying off of men and beasts began. Groups made up of from 1,000 to 2,000 bandits threw themselves upon sparsely settled villages, which had only just been founded, and carried away across the Ural River everything which could not escape them or which they could not destroy. Even the fortresses and fortified posts were exposed to their attacks. In one day, [201] 82 men were carried off from the small town of Iletsk. We will not enumerate the other robberies and violences which were committed (1), but limit

1. See the reports of Nepluev to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ourselves only to saying that the leader of these furious bands was Derbeshali, a sultan and kinsman of Abulkhair, and that his aim was to go to the fortress of Sarachinsk where Khodja Akhmet was and carry him off, after he grew tired of brigandage. Russian troops prevented him from carrying this plan out, but being busy building forts, they could not stop the other raids. Part of their horses were worn out by labor and part ran away into the country, and this made them a prey to plunderers.

[201 cont.]

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[152] Meanwhile Abulkhair concealed his resentment and never ceased to give assurances to everyone of his devotion to Russia, asserting that all these attacks had been made by Kazaks who were disobeying him. He even went so far as to advise that they be penalized and punished by death (2).

2. See the letter of July, 1743 from
Khan Abulkhair to Nepluev.

But when the troops were reinforced along the Russian border, and the Bashkirs profited by the absence of the Kazaks [727] to attack their auls and began to carry off their studs, Abulkhair thought seriously of halting the raids. But this was no longer in his power to do. His people, greedy for plunder, wished to be at peace only when they were alarmed by the advance of Russian troops across the Ural to go into the steppes to punish the [67] brigands. This was only a rumor, spread on purpose, no doubt, by the prudent head of the Orenburg region. Yet this was not where the true intentions of the Russian government lay. It did not wish to lose the regular army in pursuing nomad brigands in the desert wastes, but found it more advantageous to punish them through another people, as restless and as unfaithful as the Kazaks themselves. In a word, the government wished to arm the Kalmuks against them. In the meantime, Nepluev was ordered (3) to [202] try to seize Kazaks of the leading families

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of October 31, 1743.

as hostages. Either as a consequence of this order or for some other reason, Abulkhair suddenly delivered a considerable number of Russian subjects who had been taken prisoner by his horde during the most recent raids, and promised to return the others soon.

[727] The year 1744 not only failed to bring peace along the Russian border, but even increased the dangers of those who lived there, for Khan Abulkhair removed his mask and took an open part in the hostilities of his people. His more daring subjects continued

[204 cont.]

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[662] this he used threats and favors by turns, and finally he bought various Russian articles at his own expense which he had sold to the horde, not only without profit but even at a loss.

[186] Although the circumstances were so opposed to the views of the Russian government, yet the hereditary and inveterate hate of the Kazaks for the Dzungars still had enough power to keep them from being entirely indifferent to the hints of the Russians. They preferred to leave their border in peace rather than neglect the opportunity to attack their perpetual enemies, who at this time threatened to reduce them to complete subservience. In spite of their submission to Galdan Tsyren, the khans and sultans feared his domination more than that of the Russians. However, they took part with the people in the preparations for hostilities which were being made. The tribes of the Middle Horde, who were still suffering from the ravages committed against them in 1741, almost under the walls of Orenburg, were the most anxious to help the Russian troops. They were only waiting for the opening of war between them and the Dzungars, and at the first news of the beginning of hostilities they would have thrown themselves upon the settlements of their enemies with all the fury of semi-primitive people. But their hopes were dashed, for the Dzungars, in spite of their threats, left Russia in peace. This was the only way the Kazaks could have avoided the storm which threatened them, for in spite of all the patience with which the Russian government had borne their raids on the border for more than a year, it had been firmly decided to use the troops [205] stationed on the Orenburg line and others to be added to them in order to punish the Kazaks severely.

During the interval, Sultan Khodja Akhmet, who until then had been detained as hostage in the fort at Sarachinsk, was transferred to St. Petersburg. Although Abulkhair could not have been
● [152] happy to see his son taken further away when he wished him closer, and although he was furiously angry with Nepluev and allowed
[72] himself new violence in his relations with him, still his subjects

[208 cont.]

100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

[127]

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

[186]

[152]

Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

[662]

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

[721]

While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In

[726]

January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

[211 cont.]

[✓] 648 This act against a people considered subject to Russia and
[726] the assassination of a khan who was a vassal of the empire made
● 152] Barak afraid to remain in the regions near the Russian borders,
[166] and for this reason he hastened to move away from the Aral Sea.
Having taken the route toward Turkestan, he seized the towns
of Ikan, Otrar, and Saganak and established his camps between
these towns. He did not reside here long, however, for the
[632] following year (1749), on a visit to a khoja with his two sons,
he was poisoned (2).

[662] 2. In the papers preserved in the archives
of the Border Commission in Orenburg it
can be seen that the Kazaks of the Little
Horde who came to the Russian border then
affirmed that Barak had been poisoned by
order of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, who
was blamed by Nurali for the assassination of
his father.

The news of Abulkhair's death could not have caused an
unpleasant impression in Russia. During the last years of his
life, the conduct of this khan had been such that the [possibility
of the] administration of the Little Horde by a new chief
aroused greater hope than Abulkhair's death aroused compassion.
The dignity of the empire demanded only that the Kazaks, as
subjects, should request the Empress to confirm their new khan.
It would have been dangerous and useless to annul the choice
made according to the ancient customs of the nation and to
designate another arbitrarily. But it seemed easy to cause the
people to elect one of Abulkhair's sons. With this in mind
Nepluev, after [212] consulting Tevkelev, sent to the horde
an officer who was charged with contriving the means of making
the choice of the people fall upon Sultan Nurali and if he was
successful to convince him as well as the elders of the
necessity of sending an embassy to Petersburg to request the
confirmation of the Empress.

X 648
[141] [214 cont.]

preserved until today in the archives
of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

X 648
765 result [215] of the vanity which is very common among the Kazaks. But since there was nothing harmful in it, Nepluev reported it to the higher authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only consented to satisfy the wish of Abulkhair's family, but even found that its execution would be useful, if Nurali consented to choose the site of the burial monument in the vicinity of the Russian border and to bring the body of his father there. Then a rule could be established of burying all the khans of the Little Horde there, and a city could be erected near the cemetery which Abulkhair himself had asked to be built. It was resolved, in accordance with these considerations, to yield to Nurali's wish, and a civilian official and an engineer sent from Orenburg announced to him the conditions under which this work had to be carried out. The official was told to invite Nurali to locate the site of the sepulcher three or four days' journey from the Russian border, above all on the Ileik River, and to associate a town with it. The engineer was ordered to examine the site, draw a map of it, and to make the façade of the monument.

This object gave rise to correspondence and conferences which went on for several years. Regulating itself according to circumstances and the conduct of the Khan, the Russian government showed itself sometimes ready and sometimes averse to carrying out his desire. Finally the project was relegated to oblivion, as we shall see below. The reasons for it were strong enough on both sides.

● [152] Nurali was afraid of establishing himself near the Russian
[66] military lines, and his subjects were against it. Thus the first response they gave as the choice of a site was too undecisive. Subsequently it was proposed to lay the foundation of the cemetery and build the town at the mouth of the Emba instead of on the Ileik River, but since this river too was near the border, and the Kazaks also feared to settle there (1), [216] the khan for the second

1. Second Lieutenant Rigelman, who went

[217 cont.]

^{x648}
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⁶⁶² the Dzungarian kungtaidji. She had incited his son Sanzhip to depart for Dzungaria with 15,000 tents in 1701. If the Dzungars, who had already subjugated the Great Horde long since and had hostages from all the sultans of the Middle Horde, also were united with the Little Horde through the alliance of their sovereigns, then the entire population of the lands [218] beginning from the western territories of China of that time until the northern part of the Caspian Sea could be put in movement at the first signal of one single chief, and the entire length of the Russian border, from the upper Irtysh all the way to the mouth of the Ural River, could be exposed to attack on the same day.

In order to avert this danger, it was indispensable for the Russian government to forbid Nurali to become the brother-in-law of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, and it was ordered that all proper measures be taken to prevent this alliance. It was regarded as most efficacious to use the counsels of a man respected by the Khan and known to all the Little Horde, namely Tevkelev. To this end he was sent to Orenburg expressly to have a conference with Nurali. In order to support the advice, favors, and promises with which Tevkelev was to load the Khan, Nepluev was commanded to begin the funeral monument for Abulkhair immediately and to add residences for the khans in order to please Nurali and his brothers. It was likewise decided to accept the illegitimate Chingis as hostage in place of the khan's legitimate brother (1), a thing which had often been refused to Abulkhair.

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 2, 1749 and August 13, 1750.

● [52] During the interval, Nurali was dismayed by the rumor which was spread that if the Dzungarian kungtaidji had a son by his sister, he would exterminate all the Kazak chiefs and their descendants in order to give that son the position of sole khan of all the Kazaks.

^{x648} The death of Abulkhair's daughter destined for the chief of the Dzungars, which took place in 1750, reassured Russia.

[249 cont.]

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643 father's aims. It was only necessary to know whether the creation of a deputy of the khan would not make the Kazaks discontented and whether they might not refuse to recognize their future chief. It was also necessary to know what [250] Ishim's personal inclinations toward Russia were and whether this novelty might not lead to some unpleasant consequences for her. It was ordered that research be made at the horde itself on all these points and that the results be sent to Petersburg. The authorities in Orenburg replied that according to the custom of the Kazaks, the position of khan should pass to one of his brothers after the death of Nurali and not to one of his sons. The Minister answered that the law of succession in private life could not be applied to succession to the title of khan, because this title always passed from one man to another by the choice of the people. Nevertheless it was decided, in order to avoid grumbling and dissension, to induce the Kazaks to choose Sultan Ishim themselves as the deputy of the khan and to confirm the choice of the people afterwards.

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[167] While studies were being made on this subject and the correspondence continued, the year 1771 arrived and the desertion of the Kalmuks caused the Kazaks matters to be forgotten, not only by the government but by the Kazaks themselves, as we will see later. This is why Khan Nurali's plan to elevate his son to the post of his deputy remained unfulfilled.

[152] He could have attained his end if the death of his son, who arrived in Orenburg in 1769 where he was held as hostage, had not grieved him sorely and had not driven him into a stubbornness which was forgivable for a father but unpleasant for the Russian government. It was the second son he had lost in Orenburg, and both had died as children. Attributing their deaths to lack of care, he did not wish under any circumstances to give up another child of his own as hostage. And he himself refused to come to Orenburg, although he was invited to come several times by the authorities for conferences. Certain quarrels which arose between him and his brothers increased his troubles. The envy caused by the marks of attention given them by the Russian government, by using them more than it did him in its relations with the Little

K [250 cont.]

7 648 Horde, and with greater success, and finally the vexation of his
[52] [251] own weakness, all troubled him and removed his power to
578 act with coolness. Having aroused his arrogance, the court of
K Petersburg rejected the thought it had had of increasing his power
[66] over the Kazaks, a measure which had once been thought indis-
pensable. Thus Nurali came to the point where he began to be
given less consideration. In spite of his brothers' quarrels with
him, they were sent sabers as a reward for their zeal, and his
request for stipends fixed by the year were put aside. He was
even refused permission to send deputies to Petersburg. It was
directed to pay no attention to his obstinacy on the matter of the
hostage and to say to him always that Russia would know how to
maintain the Kazaks in obedience without that (1). The same

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of March 16, 1770.

thing was written that year to Sultan Ablai, who, in the hopes
of receiving several advantages and privileges from Russia,
offered to give up one of his sons as hostage, but later, after he
saw that most of his demands could not be satisfied, he refused
on fantastic pretexts to carry out what he himself had proposed.

K
[72] The renewal of the raids on the Orenburg border by the
Little Horde in 1770 was about to bring still another punishment (2)

2. Reinsdorf, the governor of Orenburg,
received on January 10, 1771 an order
from the Empress to send troops into
the Kazak steppe in order to punish the
bandits and free the prisoners.

x K
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167 upon them by the Russian government, which they were fortunate
EK enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks,
KO which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destina-
648 tion to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks
167 and now became their allies. We will now give the history of

[275 cont.]

x⁶⁴⁸ Baron Igelstrom not only forgot Batyr Syrym's former actions but even took him under his special protection, chose him as the instrument of his operations, maintained a correspondence with him at once, and held conferences with him, as though he were the chargé d'affaires or the representative of the entire national assembly. When the Khan was informed of these details, he wrote [42] [52] that Syrym was a knave who was deceiving the government and that he had no thought of re-establishing good order but only considered his own interests. The Khan also said that he attributed his own opinions to the entire assembly and that in his heart he was a sworn enemy of Russia, etc. These accusations were vindicated by time, but coming from the lips of a weak and humiliated sovereign and under circumstances which explicitly belied his accusations, they could not appear true and were accordingly allowed to slip into oblivion. It is true that Nurali added certain unequivocal signs of his devotion to Russia, for at this time he [72] released several Russian prisoners whom he had brought to the horde, offered his children as hostages, and placed himself at the disposal of the government. But he was too late. His personal submission was no longer needed. What was wanted was the force of power or of genius, which alone was capable of acting upon the horde.

x⁶⁴⁸ Syrym had already acquired this force by his intelligence, 643 his influence over the people, and by the protection of the border 661 authorities. Thus it appeared that he promised greater advantages than the Khan, who had shown nothing but weakness for 37 years. The fate of this unhappy prince deserves pity. Yet following the opinion he had formed of Nurali and the system which had been adopted, Baron Igelstrom no longer found it possible to keep him in the horde. Thus he asked permission to [276] have the Khan brought into Russia, and once he had been received (1),

1. By a rescript of the Empress of June 3, 1786.

^x 648 [276 cont.]

[643] he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented
667] with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their
[721] own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against
579] Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and
pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless,
turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from
the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to with-
draw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from
this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later.
His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

• [152] It is useless to describe the impression which these events
662] gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair.
The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and
valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with
Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered
the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg,
traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found
Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the
Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the mis-
fortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the pro-
tection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more
than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his
[726] family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him
with an army which was few in number but could be counted
upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He
captured the representative of the national assembly, the title
which Syrym gave himself.

[668] At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who
643] were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to
follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices
and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

[310 cont.]

342 in and protect the interior of the tent from dust and the heat of the sun. The tents of ordinary people are of gray felt, and those of the great or the rich of white felt. But some sultans, the most powerful ones in the Middle and the Great Hordes, have theirs covered with red cloth and lined inside with fabrics of silk. The [565] poorest people, on the contrary, substitute mats of tree bark and leaves for the pieces of felt, and sometimes they even use reeds and grass.

352 The far side of the tent, opposite the door, is occupied by [271] chests covered with rugs. These serve for the storage of dresses, [411] robes, and other clothing. Rifles, sabers, bows, arrows, saddles, [415] harnesses, powderhorns, etc. are hung inside the tent, as well as towels, teapots, jugs, tursuks (kinds of sacks of hide), and frequently pieces of smoked horsemeat as well. The ground, which serves as the floor, is covered with rugs or pieces of felt. On these rugs great vases are arranged, kettles, wooden headboards [chevets] on which pillows are placed, and boxes of a special kind which are ornamented in different ways and in which sacks are placed which contain kumiss.

[492] A Kazak assembles and dismantles his tent in half an hour [231] and constantly carries it on the back of a camel to the places where he finds good pasturage and water for his herds. Thus he is more dependent upon his herds and studs than on anything else.

[233] [311] Later we will give a detailed description of their herds. [182] But it should be stated here that this kind of occupation determines all their social obligations and relations, so that no matter how one imagines a Kazak one can only see an armed shepherd in him. And the habit and taste for the pastoral life is the source of all his actions, both moral and physical.

233 The continual travels of the Kazaks and the change of loca-
 152 tion does not tire them. On the contrary, they find in it a source
 181 of pleasure and consider themselves lucky not to be attached to the
 121 soil. During the summer the nomadic life is really very pleasant,
 132 but it is unbearable during the winter. During this season the
 Kazak, surrounded on all sides by piles of snow, rarely emerge from their tents. There, huddled around the fire (1), they suffer almost

1. In places where there is no wood, they use animal dung for fuel.

[314 cont.]

311 On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that all the Kazaks
241 can apply themselves to agriculture, for aside from their aversion
for this kind of life, they have too little arable land, as one can
see in the geographic section of this work [untranslated]. In addi-
tion, even assuming that these nomads did occupy themselves
with the cultivation of land, would the products they grew com-
pensate for the reduction of the herds? All the peoples who border
[243] on the Kazak steppes need livestock, and they produce enough
grain so that it is always a better bargain for them than grain which
could be brought from far away. So that if neither the Russians,
nor the Chinese, nor the inhabitants of Kokand, nor the Bukharans,
nor the Khivans will pay the Kazaks the price of their labors as
agriculturalists, what will the latter have to give them in exchange
for the manufactured products which they cannot do without and
which they pay for today with livestock?

[175 [315] Let us add to this picture the physical revolutions to
[132] which the surface of the Kazak steppe is subject. The Dimas and
312 Bascatis [rivers] which, according to Ptolemy, watered these lands,
no longer exist. The Kenderlik [River], which indicated in the
Bolshoi Chertezh, is no longer there. The Kizil-Darya, so often
discussed by Abulgazi Baiadur Khan and which is still seen on the
old maps, has completely disappeared. The Yany-Darya, which
was born, so to speak, in our day, has already ceased to flow.
The Aksakal-Barby lakes have diminished greatly. The high points
of Sari-Bulak and Kuk-Tirnak, which used to be washed by the
Aral Sea according to old Kazaks, are now at a distance of eight
hours walk away. Many tiny lakes and wells have dried up entirely.
Finally, in regions which are completely deprived of water one
sees huge ruins which indicate the former existence of a large
population. These phenomena are nothing to a nomadic people,
because they move their location all the time, but they are
destructive for a sedentary people.

181 Let us now recall the prejudice which has been implanted, and
● 152 is unfortunately well fixed, and has spread among the Kazaks,
namely that they will lose their freedom (1) the moment they leave

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1. The Russian government has built houses
for the Kazak sultans (as for Ablai and others),

[315 cont.]

often as its own expense, and has used every means of persuasion to induce certain individuals among them to settle down, at least to provide an example. But all these efforts have been futile.

579 their tents to live in houses. Next let us examine the ethical rela-
627 tions of the tribes and descent lines. Vengeance carried out by
628 one individual against another, the participation of their families
578 in it, their auls, their /clan/ divisions, and sometimes their tribes,
and the perpetual reprisals which result from this, sometimes re-
166 quire hundreds of families to move away from their dwelling
places and to withdraw much farther away, forever, in order to
evade the persecutions of their enemies.

721 It is thus that the entire Karakalpak nation, which had lived
independently under the orders of its own khans on the [316] shores
of the Syr [Darya], lost its existence as a state in the last years
of the 18th century and was forced to disperse as a consequence of
the frequent attacks of the Kazaks and the acts of vengeance that
they carried out to wipe away old injuries.

101 In 1740 a large part of the Middle-Horde, with its khan,
Abul Mahmet, occupied the eastern shores of the Khobda River.
Abulkhair lived most often on the shores of the Syr [Darya] or the
Kuvan. This is why he wrote to Nepluev in Orenburg in 1742:

166 "I am with the Little Horde on the Syr [Darya], and the Middle
Horde is near you, General." Today it is the opposite. None of
the tribes of the Middle Horde are near Orenburg. Several of the
auls of the Alimuly descent line in 1821 even came to make their
winter camps on the banks of the Ile, although they had always
578 had them on the Syr [Darya], as a result of internal dissensions,
during which their enemies were supported by the Khan of Khiva.

At the same time several auls which habitually camped near the
361 Russian border withdrew toward the land of Khiva. All this leads
181 us to the conclusion that the present way of life of the Kazaks and
636 the nature of the land they inhabit do not permit them to form
177 permanent establishments, and that for their own advantage as